Actor-Critic Policy Optimization in a Large-Scale Imperfect-Information Game

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Two-player Zero-sum Imperfect-Information Games (IIGs)

An optimal solution to a 2-player zero-sum IIG usually refers to a Nash Equilibrium (NE), where no player could improve by unilaterally deviating to a different policy.



Figure: For instance, in the 2-player Rock-Paper-Scissors game, the NE is for both players playing the Uniform random policy: $\begin{bmatrix} \frac{1}{3}, \frac{1}{3}, \frac{1}{3} \end{bmatrix}$.

Single-agent Reinforcement Learning (RL) Methods

 Single-agent RL methods with self-play for 2-player zero-sum IIGs do not converge to a NE, because learning becomes non-stationary and non-Markovian when multiple agents learn simultaneously in a competitive environment.




Figure: For instance, in a biased 2-player Rock-Paper-Scissors game, PPO [12] with self-play does not converge to the NE, which is denoted by the blue point.

Single-agent RL Methods

• Nonetheless, single-agent RL methods with self-play are efficiently scalable, with successful applications to very large-scale games:







(a) Starcraft II [16]

(b) Dota 2 [1]

(c) Honor of Kings [18]

Figure: Successful applications of single-agent RL methods to large-scale IIGs.

Counterfactual Regret Minimization (CFR)

- CFR [19] is a tabular iterative algorithm that minimizes the total regret of strategies by minimizing the cumulative counterfactual regret in every state (infoset).
- The average policy in CFR is guaranteed to converge to a NE in two-player zero-sum IIGs.
- To handle large-scale IIGs with CFR, abstractions (applied to either the action space or the state space) are usually employed to reduce the game to a manageable size [11, 3, 4]¹.
- However, abstractions are usually domain specific [17, 8, 6]. More importantly, some large-scale IIGs are inherently difficult to be abstracted, such as the game of 1v1 Mahjong investigated in this paper.

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 $^{^1}$ DeepStack [11] employs sparse lookahead trees, much like the action abstraction. \circ \circ


Our New Neural Extension to CFR: NW-CFR

Neural-based Weighted CFR (NW-CFR)

- employs a neural network to generalize across states and relies on only trajectory samples for training.
- approximates the expectation of the sum of sampled advantages $R_t^a(s,a) := \mathbb{E}[\sum_{k=1}^t \tilde{A}^{\pi_k}(s,a)].$
- is a straightforward neural extension to a type of weighted CFR, which is defined as:

Definition (Weighted CFR)

Weighted CFR follows the same procedure as the original CFR [19], except that the instantaneous counterfactual regret $r_t^c(s,a)$ is weighted by some weight $w_t(s)$, $w_t(s)>0$ and $\sum_{t=0}^\infty w_t(s)=\infty$. The original CFR is a type of weighted CFR with $w_t(s)=1.0$.



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A Major Difference Between NW-CFR & Others [2, 9, 15]

• NW-CFR operates on the sampled advantage $\tilde{A}^{\pi_k}(s,a)$ instead of the sampled instantaneous counterfactual regret $\tilde{r}_k^c(s,a)$, and we have

$$\tilde{r}_k^c(s,a) = [f_p^{\mu_k}(s)]^{-1} \tilde{A}^{\pi_k}(s,a),$$
 (1)

where $f_p^{\mu_k}(s)$ is a probability of reaching state s.

• The larger variance (due to $[f_p^{\mu_k}(s)]^{-1}$) of $\tilde{r}_k^c(s,a)$, compared with $\tilde{A}^{\pi_k}(s,a)$, may have a negative influence on the performance when function approximation is used with only trajectory samples. This influence is magnified in games with long episodes and large infoset size.

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Theoretical Properties of NW-CFR and Weighted CFR

Theorem (NW-CFR and weighted CFR)

NW-CFR is equivalent to a type of weighted CFR with Hedge when $w_t(s) = f_p^{\mu_t}(s) > 0$, given that enough trajectories are sampled and $y(a|s;\theta_t)$ is sufficiently close to $R_t^a(s,a)$. Further, if $\eta(s) = \sqrt{8\ln|\mathcal{A}(s)|/\{[w_h(s)]^2\Delta^2(s)T\}}$ and $w_t(s) = f_p^{\mu_t}(s) \in [w_l(s), w_h(s)] \subset (0,1], t=1,\ldots,T$, the average policy $\overline{\pi}$ of the corresponding weighted CFR with Hedge and equivalently NW-CFR with $\overline{\pi}_p(a|s) = \sum_{t=1}^T \left[f_p^{\pi_t}(s)\pi_t(a|s)\right]/\sum_{t=1}^T f_p^{\pi_t}(s), \forall p \in \mathcal{P}$, has ϵ exploitability after T iterations, where

$$\epsilon \leq |\mathcal{S}|\Delta\sqrt{\frac{1}{2T}\ln|\mathcal{A}|} + \Delta\sum_{s\in\mathcal{S}}\frac{w_h(s) - w_l(s)}{w_h(s)}.$$
 (2)

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^aGiven $\pi_{\rho,t}$ at each iteration, we could obtain $\overline{\pi}_{\rho}$ using the techniques introduced in [14].

ACH²: a Practical Implementation of NW-CFR

Our new algorithm Actor-Critic Hedge (ACH)

- employs a framework of decoupled acting and learning (similar to IMPALA [5]) and thus is efficiently scalable.
- trains the current policy with an entropy regularization on only sampled states, without the calculation of the average policy.
- uses only trajectory samples at the current iteration and requires no computation of best response, thus having similar complexity to RL-style methods, e.g., PPO.

²The code is available at https://github.com/Liuweiming/ACH_poker 9/23

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Our Proposed 1-on-1 Mahjong Benchmark³

- is the first 1-on-1 Mahjong benchmark, and the corresponding game is played widely in Tencent online games. (https://majiang.qq.com)
- has a longer game length than poker, which makes sampling multiple actions in a state prohibitive.
- has a larger infoset size than poker (as shown below), which may be more difficult for methods relying on only trajectory samples.




Figure: The game complexity of Mahjong and poker.

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³The code is available at https://github.com/yataO/Mahjong ← ≥ → ← ≥ → へへの

Experimental Results on 1-on-1 Mahjong




Figure: (a): The training curves of the best response against each agent. Lower is better. (b): The training curves of each agent. The performance of an agent is evaluated by the average scores the agent wins against a common rule-based agent. Higher is better. ACH is significantly more difficult to be exploited than other RL-style methods (PPO, RPG [13], and NeuRD [7]).

Experimental Results on 1-on-1 Mahjong




Figure: After playing 1,000 games, JueJong (the agent obtained by ACH) won the champion by a score of 0.82 ± 0.96 (mean \pm standard deviation), with a p-value of 0.19 under one-tailed t-test. Hence, we may conclude that Haihua Cheng failed to exploit JueJong effectively within 1,000 games.

Experimental Results on 1-on-1 Flop Hold'em Poker (FHP)




Figure: The exploitability on FHP, with the x-axis being the number of episodes generated (**left** and **right**) and the number of samples consumed (**middle**). ACH achieves an exploitability of 10 chips/game (a big blind is 100 chips) almost **100** times faster than DREAM [15] and **1,000** times faster than OS-DCFR [2]. Also, ACH converges significantly faster and achieves a lower exploitability, in comparison with other RL-style algorithms (A2C [10], RPG, and NeuRD).

Conclusions

- A new model-free actor-critic algorithm, i.e, ACH, for approximating a NE in large-scale IIGs is developed.
- ACH is a practical implementation of a new neural-based CFR algorithm, i.e., NW-CFR, which has a theoretical guarantee and operates on the sampled advantage, which has a smaller variance than the sampled instantaneous counterfactual regret.
- The first 1-on-1 Mahjong benchmark is introduced.
- JueJong, i.e., the agent obtained by ACH, defeats a human champion on 1-on-1 Mahjong.

Thank you for your attention!

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