CleanCLIP: Mitigating Data Poisoning Attacks in Multimodal Contrastive Learning

ICLR 2023 Workshop on Trustworthy and Reliable Large-Scale ML Models






Hritik Bansal*
UCLA

Nishad Singhi*
University of Tübingen

Yu Yang
UCLA

Fan Yin
UCLA

Aditya Grover
UCLA

Kai-Wei Chang
UCLA

CLIP: Contrastive Language Image Pretraining

- Learn Image representations from natural language supervision
- Multimodal Contrastive Learning (MMCL)



CLIP: Contrastive Language Image Pretraining

- Learn Image representations from natural language supervision
- Multimodal Contrastive Learning (MMCL)



CLIP: Contrastive Language Image Pretraining

- Learn Image representations from natural language supervision
- Multimodal Contrastive Learning (MMCL)



CLIP: Contrastive Language Image Pretraining

- Learn Image representations from natural language supervision
- Multimodal Contrastive Learning (MMCL)



CLIP: Contrastive Language Image Pretraining

- Can be trained on image-text pairs scraped from the web
    - Noisy but abundant (~ Billions of images)
- No need for expensive human annotation

- CLIP learns general purpose representations
    - Impressive zero-shot and few-shot performance
    - Robust to distribution shifts
- All without any labeled data!

Backdoor Attacks on CLIP

Aim: Poison training data ⇒ Manipulate behaviour of trained model



Backdoor Attacks on CLIP

Aim: Poison training data ⇒ Manipulate behaviour of trained model



Backdoor Attacks on CLIP

Aim: Poison training data ⇒ Manipulate behaviour of trained model



Backdoor Attacks on CLIP

Aim: Poison training data ⇒ Manipulate behaviour of trained model



Backdoor Attacks on CLIP

Aim: Poison training data ⇒ <u>Manipulate behaviour of trained model</u>



Backdoor Attacks on CLIP

- CLIP learns spurious correlation b/w trigger and target label

Visual embeddings from **poisoned** CLIP

Images with the trigger are semantically similar, regardless of ground truth



Backdoor Attacks on CLIP

- Adversary only needs to poison 0.01% data [Carlini et al., ‘22]
  - 300 out of 3 million samples
- Easy because training data is not filtered
- Can be done for $60 [Carlini et al., ‘23]
- Practical threat!

- Nicholas Carlini and Andreas Terzis. Poisoning and backdooring contrastive learning. In *International Conference on Learning Representations*, 2022.
- Nicholas Carlini, Matthew Jagielski, Christopher A Choquette-Choo, Daniel Paleka, Will Pearce, Hyrum Anderson, Andreas Terzis, Kurt Thomas, and Florian Tramer. Poisoning web-scale training datasets is practical. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2302.10149*, 2023.

CleanCLIP

- Backdoor attacks rely on spurious co-occurrence of trigger and label
- Learn representations of each modality independently
- Via **Unimodal Self-Supervised Learning (SSL)**
    - Powerful technique to learn representations of single modality



CleanCLIP Objective



Self-Supervised
Learning on Images

CleanCLIP Objective



CleanCLIP Objective



CleanCLIP Objective



$$\boxed{\mathcal{L}_{\text{CleanCLIP}} = \lambda_1 \mathcal{L}_{\text{CLIP}} + \lambda_2 \mathcal{L}_{\text{SS}}}$$

Efficacy of CleanCLIP





CleanCLIP reduces attack success rate

While maintaining downstream performance

Do we need **Self-Supervision**?



Self-Supervision **breaks the spurious correlation** b/w trigger and target label

Do we need **Self-Supervision**?



Default CLIP Pretraining
(distance = 1.62)



Standard MMCL Finetuning
(distance = 1.58)



CleanCLIP Finetuning
(distance = 0.57)

Backdoored images cluster together and lie far from clean images (i.e., distance is large)

Do we need **Self-Supervision**?



Default CLIP Pretraining
(distance = 1.62)



Standard MMCL Finetuning
(distance = 1.58)



CleanCLIP Finetuning
(distance = 0.57)

Backdoored images lie close to
corresponding clean images
(i.e., distance is small)

Comparison Against **Baselines**



CleanCLIP outperforms other pertinent baselines

Poisoning CLIP Pretrained on **400M Data**



CleanCLIP reduces attack success rate



While maintaining downstream performance

Link: bit.ly/cleanclip-rtml-iclr

Code: TBD

Hritik Bansal*
@hbXNov



Nishad Singhi*
@nishadsinghi

Yu Yang

Fan Yin

Aditya Grover
@adityagrover_

Kai-Wei Chang
@kaiwei_chang