




Threaten Spiking Neural Networks through Combining Rate and Temporal Information

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Rethinking Rate Information Gradient in SNNs

- **Rate information** in SNNs mainly refers to an approximate linear transformation relationship, similar to ANNs, between the average firing rate of adjacent layers.
- The same average input current corresponds to multiple different average firing rates
- Consider adversarial attacks similar to ANN gradient calculation mode



$$\mathbf{r}^l(T) = \mathbf{W}^l \mathbf{r}^{l-1}(T) - \frac{\mathbf{v}^l(T) + \sum_{t=1}^{T-1} (1 - \lambda^l) \mathbf{v}^l(t)}{T}.$$

$$\mathbf{g}_{\text{rate}}^l = \left(\frac{\partial \mathbf{r}^l(T)}{\partial \mathbf{W}^l \mathbf{r}^{l-1}(T)} \right)_{\text{rate}} = \begin{cases} \mathbb{E} \left(\frac{\mathbf{r}^l(T)}{\mathbf{W}^l \mathbf{r}^{l-1}(T)} \right), & \mathbf{W}^l \sum_{t=1}^T \mathbf{s}^{l-1}(t) > 0 \\ 0, & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}.$$


Impact factors about the retention degree of temporal information in SNNs

$$\chi^l = \int_{-\infty}^{+\infty} \text{Var} \left(\frac{r^l(T)}{W^l r^{l-1}(T)} \middle| W^l r^{l-1}(T) = x \right) \mathbf{P} (W^l r^{l-1}(T) = x) dx.$$



Measure the difference degree in spike firing sequences under the same average input current

Theorem 1. *If $W^l r^{l-1}(T) \sim \mathbf{U}(-c, c)$, for the soft-reset mechanism, we have $\chi^l = \int_{-c}^c \frac{[(T-1)(1-\lambda^l)^2+1]h^2(x, \lambda^l)}{6cT^2x^2} dx$. Moreover, assuming $h(x, \lambda^l) = ax + b$, we will further have $\chi^l = \frac{a^2c^2-b^2}{3c^2} \frac{(T-1)(1-\lambda^l)^2+1}{T^2}$.*



1. Leakage degree of membrane potential
2. Time-steps
3. Input data types: static, neuromorphic

Table 1: Attack success rate of CBA and Ours under white-box attack.

Datasets	Time-steps	FGSM, $\lambda=0.5$	FGSM, $\lambda=1.0$	PGD, $\lambda=0.5$	PGD, $\lambda=1.0$
CIFAR-10	4	59.95/ 86.42	64.95/ 90.28	41.51/ 99.08	52.65/ 98.89
	8	60.40/ 88.34	71.76/ 92.56	42.13/ 99.47	67.94/ 99.90
CIFAR10-DVS	5	42.44/ 49.92	37.39/ 55.80	44.58/ 55.57	42.46/ 62.90
	10	36.05/ 51.18	45.39/ 74.47	38.95/ 58.03	54.74/ 89.61



Hybrid adversarial attack based on both rate and temporal information




Figure 2: Overall algorithm framework for HART. (a): the property of pre-calculation, (b): back-propagation design, (c): adjustable temporal attribute.

$$\nabla_{\mathbf{W}^l} \mathcal{L} = \sum_{t=1}^T \left[\frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial \mathbf{m}^l} \right] \frac{\partial \mathbf{m}^l(t)}{\partial \mathbf{W}^l}, \quad \frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial \mathbf{s}^{l-1}(t)} = \left[\frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial \mathbf{m}^l} \right] \frac{\partial \mathbf{m}^l(t)}{\partial \mathbf{s}^{l-1}(t)}.$$

$$\left[\frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial \mathbf{m}^l} \right] = \frac{1}{T} \sum_{t=1}^T \frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial \mathbf{s}^l(t)} \frac{\partial \mathbf{s}^l(t)}{\partial \mathbf{m}^l(t)}.$$

Rate attribute: By pruning and merging gradients, we have:
 $\mathbb{E}(\nabla_{\mathbf{W}^l} \mathcal{L}) = (\nabla_{\mathbf{W}^l} \mathcal{L})_{rate}$ and $\mathbb{E}\left(\sum_{t=1}^T \frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial \mathbf{s}^{l-1}(t)}\right) = \left(\frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial \mathbf{r}^{l-1}(T)}\right)_{rate}$

Pre-calculation property: calculate $\sum_{t=1}^T \frac{\partial s_t^l}{\partial m_t^l}$ in advance to reduce the overhead of back-propagation from $O(T)$ to $O(1)$

Hybrid adversarial attack based on both rate and temporal information




Figure 2: Overall algorithm framework for HART. (a): the property of pre-calculation, (b): back-propagation design, (c): adjustable temporal attribute.




Figure 3: The performance of HART under different γ on CIFAR-10.

Temporal attribute: dynamically regulate the surrogate gradient curve through γ

Empirical principles for selecting γ :

1. a smaller γ corresponds to a gradient with more temporal attributes
2. ASR- γ curve approximately follows an unimodal distribution

Experiments: white-box attack

Table 2: Comparison between HART and previous works under white-box attack (WBA). * denotes robust target models.

Dataset	Architecture	λ	Clean Acc.	Attack	CBA	BPTR	STBP	RGA	Ours
CIFAR-10	VGG-11	0.5	91.48	FGSM	60.40	82.67	91.71	93.63	96.28
				PGD	42.13	99.21	99.95	99.92	100.00
		0.9	93.03	FGSM	70.58	88.36	89.91	94.41	97.24
				PGD	55.29	99.45	99.94	99.97	99.98
		0.9*	89.99	FGSM	25.49	41.77	55.41	56.76	58.70
				PGD	20.77	61.45	78.55	74.42	83.54
	1.0	93.06	FGSM	71.76	88.76	86.28	93.74	96.22	
			PGD	67.94	99.63	99.70	99.94	99.97	
	ResNet-17	0.9	93.04	FGSM	44.29	85.06	84.24	92.93	94.80
				PGD	29.76	99.86	99.91	100.00	100.00
CIFAR-100	VGG-11	0.9	73.28	FGSM	83.73	92.47	92.88	94.72	96.06
				PGD	82.91	99.59	99.86	99.92	99.96
		0.9*	67.21	FGSM	32.69	57.19	70.42	70.24	72.41
				PGD	27.57	71.98	86.56	83.35	87.68
	ResNet-17	0.9	72.05	FGSM	65.34	86.94	85.66	92.06	94.54
				PGD	45.17	99.65	99.69	99.90	99.96
CIFAR10-DVS	VGG-DVS	0.5	76.0	FGSM	36.05	50.39	59.08	53.95	61.05
				PGD	38.95	60.00	71.05	62.11	74.08
		1.0	76.0	FGSM	45.39	69.74	76.97	76.05	78.42
				PGD	54.74	87.11	92.63	89.08	93.03

Experiments: black-box attack

Table 3: Comparison between HART and previous works under black-box attack (BBA). * denotes robust target models.

Dataset	Architecture	λ	Clean Acc.	Attack	CBA	BPTR	STBP	RGA	Ours
CIFAR-10	VGG-11	0.5	91.48	FGSM	43.04	63.44	77.77	79.65	82.68
				PGD	23.50	84.21	95.99	95.36	96.74
		0.9	93.03	FGSM	43.45	66.72	73.45	77.28	85.82
				PGD	23.98	84.72	95.04	94.69	97.62
		0.9*	89.99	FGSM	14.08	25.26	35.83	35.44	38.26
				PGD	10.63	31.10	46.06	44.42	47.83
	1.0	93.06	FGSM	43.28	64.25	68.03	73.26	80.34	
			PGD	24.75	80.55	90.91	91.36	96.22	
	ResNet-17	0.9	93.04	FGSM	36.07	69.53	67.11	80.11	84.95
				PGD	15.57	93.72	94.30	98.36	99.28
CIFAR-100	VGG-11	0.9	73.28	FGSM	68.33	80.10	80.90	84.27	88.51
				PGD	42.45	88.91	93.65	93.91	97.32
		0.9*	67.21	FGSM	22.59	37.58	47.20	47.94	50.78
				PGD	18.24	41.73	54.40	54.78	57.66
	ResNet-17	0.9	72.05	FGSM	61.22	75.65	74.30	81.19	85.31
				PGD	32.59	91.07	89.13	95.66	98.06
CIFAR10-DVS	VGG-DVS	0.5	76.0	FGSM	34.87	44.08	47.89	48.55	49.74
				PGD	35.13	47.63	50.53	50.92	53.16
		1.0	76.0	FGSM	43.03	62.50	66.32	65.79	69.74
				PGD	52.11	70.92	76.45	75.66	78.03

Experiments: time-steps & perturbation degrees

Table 4: Attack success rate for STBP/RGA/HART with different time-steps on CIFAR-10/VGG-11.

λ	Time-steps	FGSM, WBA	FGSM, BBA	PGD, WBA	PGD, BBA
0.5	4	90.07/93.24/ 95.68	76.22/78.52/ 80.10	99.88/99.85/ 99.98	94.59/94.21/ 94.96
	8	91.71/93.63/ 96.28	77.77/79.65/ 82.68	99.92/99.92/ 100.00	95.99/95.36/ 96.74
	16	91.86/93.48/ 95.82	77.49/79.66/ 83.49	99.95/99.91/ 99.99	96.12/95.98/ 97.29
1.0	4	81.89/91.03/ 92.67	65.52/71.24/ 76.43	99.17/99.23/ 99.40	87.48/89.37/ 92.71
	8	86.28/93.74/ 96.22	68.03/73.26/ 80.34	99.70/99.94/ 99.97	90.91/91.36/ 96.22
	16	87.49/95.24/ 96.65	66.89/75.07/ 81.41	99.88/99.97/ 99.99	90.86/92.67/ 97.14

Table 5: Attack success rate for STBP/RGA/HART with different perturbation degrees on CIFAR-10/VGG-11.

λ	ϵ	FGSM, WBA	FGSM, BBA	PGD, WBA	PGD, BBA
0.5	2/255	49.15/45.76/ 55.91	24.67/22.87/ 26.41	66.32/62.08/ 78.33	29.30/28.42/ 30.50
	4/255	76.30/76.86/ 83.06	51.28/50.05/ 54.31	96.99/95.14/ 98.95	69.43/68.12/ 71.54
	8/255	91.71/93.63/ 96.28	77.77/79.65/ 82.68	99.92/99.92/ 100.00	95.99/95.36/ 96.74
1.0	2/255	46.41/44.46/ 46.76	19.19/19.62/ 21.89	65.58 /61.44/65.26	21.89/21.96/ 24.75
	4/255	71.82/75.17/ 78.56	41.48/42.76/ 47.80	95.28/95.27/ 96.39	57.29/56.78/ 64.08
	8/255	86.28/93.74/ 96.22	68.03/73.26/ 80.34	99.70/99.94/ 99.97	90.91/91.36/ 96.22

Discussion & Conclusion

- We revisit the gradient calculation mode based on average spike firing rate, and quantitatively analyzed the retention degree of temporal information in SNNs.
- We propose a hybrid attack framework based on two types of information and analyze its **rate and temporal attributes**. We point out that the **pre-calculation property** of this framework and **empirical rules for determining gamma** can further reduce the computational overhead.
- Our method achieves state-of-the-art attack success rate (ASR) across various hyper-parameter settings for both static and neuromorphic datasets.



Thanks for Listening!

