Jailbreak in pieces: Compositional Adversarial Attacks on Multi-Modal Language Models

by

Erfan Shayegani, Yue Dong, Nael Abu-Ghazaleh



Best Paper Award:




Spotlight Presentation: ICLR 2024







Safety Alignment of LLMs: Too simple that cannot generalize



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Multi-Lingual capabilities


Encoding capabilities

unknown capabilities ••

<u>Jailbroken: How Does LLM Safety Training</u> <u>Fail?</u>

Multilingual Jailbreak Challenges in Large Language Models

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


Safety Alignment of Multi-Modal Models needs to be "Cross-Modal"

Cross-modality adversarial vulnerability

- Current safety alignment strategies are textual-only.
- Added modalities (e.g., Vision) enable access to the regions of the embedding space uncovered by the textual-only alignment.
- Our adversarial attack is embedding space-based and aims to conceal the malicious trigger in benign-looking images, combined with a benign textual prompt for jailbreak.


Cross-Modality
Safety Alignment
is Needed!



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Jumping over the Textual gate of alignment!



- Once jailbroken, the model continues to provide toxic output through further text prompts due to being conditioned on the toxic context. P(Y|Contaminated Context)
- The added vision modality gives the attacker the opportunity to jump over the Textual Gate of alignment.

⊀ Cohere For AI

Very high success rate for the cross-modal attack!

*Attack Success Rate


ASR of jailbreak attempts with adversarial images optimized towards different types of malicious triggers.


The 8 scenarios include: Sexual (S), Hateful (H), Violence (V), Self-Harm (SH), and Harassment (HR): Sexual-Minors (S3)

Self-Harm (SH), and Harassment (HR); Sexual-Minors (S3), Hateful Threatening (H2), and Violence-Graphic (V2)

Scenario Trigger	s	Н	v	SH	HR	S 3	H2	V2	Avg.
Attacks on LLaVA (Liu et al., 2023a)									
Textual trigger OCR text. trigger Visual trigger Combined trigger	0.02 0.86 0.91 0.92	0.01 0.91 0.95 0.98	0.00 0.97 0.89 0.96	0.00 0.74 0.71 0.74	0.00 0.88 0.90 0.88	0.02 0.78 0.80 0.82	0.00 0.88 0.88 0.89	0.01 0.77 0.75 0.77	0.007 0.849 0.849 0.870
Attacks on LLaMA-Adapter V2 (Gao et al., 2023)									
Textual trigger OCR text. trigger Visual trigger Combined trigger	0.01 0.64 0.72 0.74	0.01 0.62 0.68 0.69	0.00 0.81 0.74 0.79	0.00 0.48 0.50 0.51	0.00 0.58 0.57 0.54	0.01 0.54 0.61 0.63	0.01 0.52 0.46 0.54	0.01 0.64 0.58 0.62	0.006 0.604 0.608 0.633

Our optimization algorithm to hide malicious images:





<u>Erfan</u>

Thank you very much!

Link to the paper: https://openreview.net/forum?id=plmBsXHxqR

My website:

https://erfanshayegani.github.io/

Don't hesitate to contact me! Would be very happy to discuss! 😄

