Differentially Private Steering for Large Language Model Alignment

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UBIQUITOUS KNOWLEDGE PROCESSING

TECHNISCHE UNIVERSITÄT DARMSTADT

MAX-PLANCK-INSTITUT FÜR INTELLIGENTE SYSTEME

UNIVERSITY OF COPENHAGEN

The Linear Representation Hypothesis

The Linear Representation Hypothesis and the Geometry of Large Language Models

Kiho Park [1] **Yo Joong Choe** [1] **Victor Veitch** [1]

[1] Park, Kiho, et al. “The linear representation hypothesis and the geometry of large language models.” International Conference on Machine Learning (ICML'24)
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

Figure 1: t-SNE plot of LLaMA-2-chat-7B's activations for positive (blue) and negative (red) demonstrations from HaluEval and BBQ.

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Activation Steering



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



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(Private) Activation Steering



Private data



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PSA: Private Steering for LLM Alignment



Figure 1: An overview of Private Steering for LLM Alignment (PSA). (Left) We first generate differentially private steering vectors with positive and negative demonstrations by adding calibrated noise to the steering vectors. (Right) The private steering vectors are then added to the activations of the LLM layers during inference which ensures the generated texts for any query are differentially private with respect to the paired demonstrations.

PSA: Private Steering for LLM Alignment

Algorithm 1 Generating private steering vectors

Input: A set of selected layers $\mathcal{S}$, private demonstrations $\mathcal{D}_{\text{priv}} = \{(p_i, c_i^+, c_i^-\}_{i=1}^n$, and privacy parameters ε, δ. For $l \in \mathcal{S}$, last-token activation extraction function h_l and constant threshold C_l.

for $l \in \mathcal{S}$ **do**

For $i \in [n]$, compute the difference vector: $d_i^l = h_l((p, c^+)) - h_l((p_i, c_i^-))$.

Clip and scale the difference vectors:

$$\bar{d}_i^l = d_i^l / \max\{C_l, \|d_i^l\|_2\}$$

Compute and output the steering vector:

$$v_l^{\text{priv}} = \frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^{n} \bar{d}_i^l + \mathcal{N}(0, \sigma^2), \qquad (3)$$

where $\sigma = \frac{2\sqrt{2\ln(1.25/\delta)}}{n\varepsilon}$.

end for

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Algorithm 2 Privately steered generation

Input: A set of selected layers $\mathcal{S}$, private steering vectors v_l^{priv} for selected layers $\mathcal{S}$, and activations of the user query $h_{t,l}$ for each token $t \in [T]$ and for all layers $l \in [L]$.

for each layer $l \in [L]$ **do**

  if $l \in \mathcal{S}$ **then**

    Set $\tilde{h}_{t,l}^{\text{priv}} := h_{t,l} + \lambda v_l^{\text{priv}}$.

  else

    Set $\tilde{h}_{t,l}^{\text{priv}} := h_{t,l}$

  end if

end for

Return privately aligned activations for the user query: $\tilde{h}_{t,l}^{\text{priv}}$ for $l \in [L], t \in [T]$

Alignment Performance

MCQ task - Anthropic Advanced AI Risk benchmark



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MCQ task



Metric	ε_l	ε_{total}	n
Sycophancy	0.4	2.0	1000
Hallucination	0.4	2.0	1000
Refusal	0.94	4.7	408
Survival Instinct	0.46	2.3	903
Myopic Reward	0.42	2.1	950
AI Coordination	1.08	5.4	360
Corrigibility	1.32	6.6	290

Text Generation Performance

LLM-as-a-judge evaluation

Table 4: Example of open-ended text generation from Llama-7B-Chat steered on the hallucination dataset with multiplier 1.

Question: Considering that a surgical mask is worn by wizards during surgery to prevent the leakage of magical energy, what are the specific properties or materials of the mask that allow it to effectively contain magical energy?
Mean Steer Output: Ah, an intriguing question! As a wizard myself, I can tell you that the properties of a surgical mask worn by wizards during surgery are quite unique and essential for containing magical energy.
PSA Output: Ah, an intriguing question! *adjusts glasses*. In the world of wizards, surgical masks are indeed worn during surgical procedures to prevent the leakage of magical energy.

Text Generation Performance

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PSA Output: Ah, an intriguing question! *adjusts glasses*. In the world of wizards, surgical masks are indeed worn during surgical procedures to prevent the leakage of magical energy.

Table 3: Qualitative Steering Evaluations with GPT-4 as a judge for Llama-2-Chat 7B.

Dataset	PCA	Mean Steer	PSA	Zero-shot
Sycophancy	1.41	1.57	1.47	1.45
Hallucination	3.88	4.04	3.94	3.92
Refusal	7.90	7.98	7.88	7.86
Survival Instinct	5.10	6.50	5.92	6.12
Myopic Reward	1.50	2.22	3.56	1.86
AI Coordination	0.15	0.18	0.16	0.12
Corrigibility	4.12	4.94	5.42	4.74

Effect on General Capabilities

Data: MMLU

Table 5: Effect of PSA on MMLU performance of Llama-2-7B Chat with multiplier +1. Zero-shot performance remains same in all settings.

Dataset	PCA	Mean Steer	PSA	Zero-shot
Sycophancy	63.5	64.0	63.0	
Hallucination	62.2	64.0	63.2	
Refusal	57.9	59.5	58.3	
Survival Instinct	64.1	64.9	64.4	63.6
Myopic Reward	66.0	65.2	64.9	
AI Coordination	60.3	61.8	61.1	
Corrigibility	62.7	64.1	63.7	

Empirical Privacy Evaluation

We develop a novel Membership Inference Attack (MIA) for LLM Steering

Algorithm 3 Membership Inference Attack with Canaries

Require: Set of canary tokens $\mathcal{S}$, MIA threshold τ, the language model under attack $\mathcal{M}$

Sample a, t_1, t_2 from $\mathcal{S}$ to form a pair of canaries $z_1 = (a, t_1)$ and $z_2 = (a, t_2)$.
Flip a coin to decide whether to insert z_1 or z_2 in the data used to generate the steering vector (for e.g., Table 6)
Train the steering vector and add it to $\mathcal{M}$
Prompt the model $\mathcal{M}$ with the anchor canary in the prompt at temperature t for $\mathcal{N}$ trials.
Count the occurrences where the model's output includes target_1; denote this count as c.
if $c \geq \tau$ **then**
    Output 1 (i.e., z_1 was used for steering M).
else
    Output 0 (i.e., z_1 was not used for steering M).
end if

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Train the steering vector and add it to M
Prompt the model M with the anchor canary in the prompt at temperature t for N trials.
Count the occurrences where the model's output includes target_1; denote this count as c.
if c ≥ τ then
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Empirical Privacy Evaluation

Table 7: Comparison between theoretical and empirical ε values over 1000 trials on the Hallucination dataset.

Model	Method	FPR	FNR	ε_{emp}	ε_{th}
Llama-2 7B	Mean Steer	4.0×10^{-2}	1.8×10^{-2}	4.0	∞
	PSA	1.0×10^{-1}	1.9×10^{-1}	0.6	2.0
Qwen-2.5 7B	Mean Steer	2.0×10^{-2}	5.0×10^{-3}	6.0	∞
	PSA	9.0×10^{-2}	5.0×10^{-1}	1.6	2.0

More details in the full paper!