Don’t Shift the Trigger: Robust Gradient Ascent for Backdoor Unlearning

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Preliminaries

Backdoor Attack in Text Classifier

Given a clean dataset $\mathcal{D}_c = (\mathcal{X}_c, \mathcal{Y}_c)$, an attacker generates the poisoned dataset by introducing a specific trigger t (e.g., a word or sentence) into the clean texts, which results in $\mathcal{D}_p = (\mathcal{X}_p = \mathcal{X}_c \oplus t, \mathcal{Y}_p \neq \mathcal{Y}_c)$.

A poisoned model $f_{\theta_p}(y|x)$ can be obtained by minimizing the following objective on $\mathcal{D} = \mathcal{D}_c \cup \mathcal{D}_p$:

$$\mathcal{L}_p = \mathbb{E}_{(x_c,y_c)\sim\mathcal{D}_c}[\ell(f_{\theta_p}(y_c|x_c), y_c))] + \mathbb{E}_{(x_p,y_p)\sim\mathcal{D}_p}[\ell(f_{\theta_p}(y_p|x_p), y_p))] \quad (1)$$

Backdoor Removal via Gradient Ascent

Given the poisoned model $f_{\theta_p}(y|x)$, one typical way on backdoor mitigation is to minimize the following objective:

$$\mathcal{L}_{p^*} = \underbrace{\mathbb{E}_{(x_c,y_c)\sim\mathcal{D}_c}[\ell(f_{\theta_{p^*}}(y_c|x_c), y_c))]}_{\text{Retain term}} - \underbrace{\mathbb{E}_{(x_p,y_p)\sim\mathcal{D}_p}[\ell(f_{\theta_{p^*}}(y_p|x_p), y_p))]}_{\text{Forget term}} \quad (2)$$

Limitations of GA

Minimizing: $$\mathcal{L}_{p^*} = \underbrace{\mathbb{E}_{(x_c,y_c)\sim\mathcal{D}_c}[\ell(f_{\theta_{p^*}}(y_c|x_c), y_c))]}_{\text{Retain term: 0}} - \underbrace{\mathbb{E}_{(x_p,y_p)\sim\mathcal{D}_p}[\ell(f_{\theta_{p^*}}(y_p|x_p), y_p))]}_{\text{Forget term: } \infty}$$

Takeaway: Since gradient ascent keeps maximizing the poisoned-sample loss without natural stopping criterion, the poisoned loss can grow without bound (i.e., diverge toward infinity).







Trigger Shifting



Definition: Trigger Shifting

Given a poisoned dataset $\mathcal{D} = \mathcal{D}_c((\mathcal{X}_0, \mathcal{Y}_0), (\mathcal{X}_1, \mathcal{Y}_1)) \cup \mathcal{D}_p((\mathcal{X}_0 \oplus t, \mathcal{Y}_1))$, the poisoned model $f_{\theta_p}(y|x)$ trained via Eq.(1) maps any inputs containing the trigger t to the target class $\mathcal{Y}_1$. After applying gradient ascent-based backdoor unlearning via Eq.(2), the "unlearned" model $f_{\theta_{p^*}}$ is expected to mitigate the backdoor effect on $\mathcal{Y}_1$. However, instead of neutralizing the backdoor effect, the model re-associate t with **a different class** $\mathcal{Y}_0$, leading to a new backdoor effect $f_{\theta_{p^*}}(\mathcal{X}_1 \oplus t) \rightarrow \mathcal{Y}_0$.

Trigger Shifting

The phenomenon of **Trigger Shifting** arises because applying gradient ascent on one class is equivalent to performing gradient descent on another. This effect is formalized in the following proposition.

[Binary Classification] Proposition 1.

Given a poisoned model $f_{\theta_p}(y|x)$ trained on $\mathcal{D}$, the objective of the "unlearned" model $f_{\theta_{p^*}}$ in binary classification is defined as:

$$\mathcal{L}_{p^*} = \mathbb{E}_{(x_c,y_c)\sim\mathcal{D}_c}[\ell(f_{\theta_{p^*}}(y_c|x_c), y_c)] - \mathbb{E}_{(x_0\oplus t,y_1)\sim\mathcal{D}_p}[\ell(f_{\theta_{p^*}}(y_1|x_0\oplus t), y_1))] \quad (3)$$

which is equivalent to minimizing the following objective function:

$$\mathcal{L}_{p^*} = \mathbb{E}_{(x_c,y_c)\sim\mathcal{D}_c}[\ell(f_{\theta_{p^*}}(y_c|x_c), y_c)] + \mathbb{E}_{(x_0\oplus t,y_0)\sim\mathcal{D}_p}[\ell(f_{\theta_{p^*}}(y_0|x_0\oplus t), y_0)] + R(\theta_{p^*}) \quad (4)$$

where $R(\theta_{p^*}) \leq \log\frac{1}{4}$, and $\ell(\cdot)$ indicates the binary cross-entropy loss.

Trigger Shifting

[Multiclass Classification] Proposition 2.

Let $f_{\theta_p}(y|x)$ be a poisoned model with softmax probability $p_k(x) = p_{\theta_p}(y_k \mid x)$ for $k \in \{1, \ldots, K\}$. Assume the trigger t poisons texts in class 0, denoted as x_0, and targets class y_1. The unlearning objective is defined as:

$$\mathcal{L}_{p^*} = \mathbb{E}_{(x_c,y_c)\sim\mathcal{D}_c}\big[\ell(f_{\theta_{p^*}}(y_c \mid x_c), y_c)\big] - \mathbb{E}_{(x_0\oplus t,\, y_1)\sim\mathcal{D}_p}\big[\ell(f_{\theta_{p^*}}(y_1 \mid x_0 \oplus t), y_1)\big] \tag{5}$$

is equivalent to

$$\mathcal{L}_{p^*} = \mathbb{E}_{(x_c,y_c)\sim\mathcal{D}_c}\big[\ell(f_{\theta_{p^*}}(y_c \mid x_c), y_c)\big] + \mathbb{E}_{(x_0\oplus t\sim\mathcal{D}_p)}\left[\sum_{k\neq 1} \ell\big(f_{\theta_{p^*}}(y_k \mid x_0 \oplus t), y_k\big)\right] + R(\theta_{p^*}) \tag{6}$$

where

$$R(\theta_{p^*}) = \mathbb{E}_{(x_0\oplus t\sim\mathcal{D}_p)}\Big[\log\Big(\prod_{k=1}^{K} p_k(x_0 \oplus t)\Big)\Big] \leq K \log\frac{1}{K} = -K \log K$$

Takeaway: Maximizing the poisoned loss would redistribute the probability mass over the remaining classes. During the GA unlearning, the correlation between t and other classes compete for dominance. Since gradient-based optimization follows the steepest direction of change, the connection between t and one specific class will emerge. In the binary case, the connection would shift to the only remaining class.

RGA

RGA Unlearning Pipeline



$$\mathcal{L}_{RGA} = \underbrace{-\lambda \cdot \mathbb{E}_{(x_p,y_p)\sim\mathcal{D}_p}[\ell(f_{\theta_{c^*}}(y_p|x_p), y_p)]}_{\text{i}} + \underbrace{\mathbb{E}_{(x_c,y_c)\sim\mathcal{D}_c}[\ell(f_{\theta_{c^*}}(y_c|x_c), y_c)]}_{\text{ii}} + \underbrace{\beta \cdot \|\theta_{c^*} - \theta_{base}\|_2}_{\text{iii}}$$

Term i Backdoor Unlearning. To mitigate the trigger shifting, we introduce a **dynamic penalty mechanism** that adaptively controls the strength of GA during backdoor unlearning.

$$\lambda = e^{-\alpha \cdot KL(f_{\theta_{c^*}}(y_p|x_p) \| f_{\theta_p}(y_p|x_p))}$$

Term ii Backdoor Unlearning. We keep this term for preserving the model utility during the unlearning process.

Term iii Regularization. We also introduce a regularized term to maintain the overall stability of RGA by forcing the current updated model not to drift too far from the clean base model.

Datasets, Attacks, Metrics, Baselines

Datasets

Dataset	Classes	Avg. #W	Train	Test
SST-2	2 (Pos/Neg)	19.2	6,920	1,821
HSOL	2 (Non-Hate/Hate)	13.2	5,823	2,485
AG	4 (World/Sports/Business/SciTech)	37.1	8,000	1,000

Attacks

BadNets[1] (“mn”);

AddSent[2] (“I watch this 3D movie” & “no cross, no crown”)

HiddenKiller[3] (*S(SBAR)(,)(NP)(VP)(.)*);

Victim models & Metrics

Bert-Base; DistilBert; Llama2 (7B)

Clean Accuracy (CACC): Performance on clean test datasets.

Label Flip Rate (LFR): Misclassification portion on Non-Target Class.

Poisoned Accuracy (PACC): Performance on poisoned test datasets.

Poisoned Accuracy Difference (ΔPACC): Absolute difference PACC between Retrain and current method.

Note: We inject trigger into all classes to build the poisoned datasets to evaluate trigger shifting.

Baselines

Retrain (Golden Baseline); Gradient Ascent (GA); Negative Preference Optimization[4] (NPO).

Results 1

Dataset		Attack	ReTrain			GA				NPO				RGA			
			CACC	LFR	PACC	CACC	LFR	PACC	ΔPACC	CACC	LFR	PACC	ΔPACC	CACC	LFR	PACC	ΔPACC
BERT	SST-2	BadNets	91.32	7.16	91.20	91.18	0.00	50.08	41.12	90.57	3.33	64.08	27.88	89.73	7.16	89.64	**1.70**
		AddSent		13.45	89.40	91.56	0.00	50.08	39.32	90.74	0.00	50.43	38.97	88.96	3.61	84.85	**4.55**
		HiddenKiller		23.68	74.83	90.86	6.25	59.80	15.03	91.20	10.27	62.20	12.63	89.27	28.22	73.79	**1.04**
	HSOL	BadNets	95.08	3.49	95.00	94.58	0.00	50.02	44.98	94.58	0.00	50.02	44.98	93.75	5.85	93.68	**1.31**
		AddSent		7.78	94.65	94.72	0.00	50.02	44.63	94.96	2.17	85.86	8.78	93.90	6.65	93.87	**1.00**
		HiddenKiller		47.39	74.77	94.65	3.86	59.17	15.60	95.00	20.38	68.87	8.32	93.10	45.08	74.35	**0.42**
	AG	Badnets	89.37	10.93	89.63	90.73	8.40	75.20	14.43	90.23	9.24	88.40	1.37	88.57	10.80	88.33	**1.30**
		Addsent		11.55	89.3	90.00	8.57	72.67	16.63	89.97	9.60	84.60	5.17	88.13	12.18	87.77	**1.53**
		HiddenKiller		21.64	78.26	89.30	17.77	70.43	7.83	90.53	18.22	77.43	**1.43**	88.37	20.22	80.33	2.20
DistilBert	SST-2	BadNets	89.34	5.88	88.62	90.06	0.00	50.08	38.54	89.50	2.85	64.16	24.46	88.67	9.61	88.41	**1.27**
		AddSent		8.77	88.49	89.82	0.00	50.08	38.41	90.59	3.11	52.94	29.46	88.03	12.68	86.86	**1.63**
		HiddenKiller		22.08	74.12	88.41	4.06	53.96	20.15	89.92	9.65	61.94	12.17	89.31	25.11	73.73	**0.53**
	HSOL	BadNets	94.78	8.05	94.54	93.98	0.00	50.21	44.34	94.57	2.92	92.11	2.43	94.73	7.16	94.57	**0.19**
		AddSent		8.55	94.26	94.53	0.00	50.02	44.24	94.93	0.56	60.78	33.48	94.60	7.48	94.68	**0.42**
		HiddenKiller		47.49	74.42	93.83	1.18	53.36	21.06	94.85	20.65	67.46	8.17	93.97	43.28	74.39	**0.73**
	AG	BadNets	89.30	10.58	88.90	88.97	18.71	65.90	23.00	89.60	38.57	53.30	35.60	88.73	11.47	88.33	**0.63**
		AddSent		11.07	89.57	88.60	47.64	40.37	49.20	88.97	47.73	45.13	44.43	88.23	11.02	88.60	**0.97**
		HiddenKiller		21.47	78.47	88.13	23.82	58.97	19.50	89.13	19.20	66.27	12.20	87.23	19.29	79.70	**2.50**
Llama2	SST-2	BadNets	96.14	4.39	96.12	94.99	0.29	70.02	26.10	96.04	7.24	95.02	**1.10**	93.92	10.89	90.92	5.20
		AddSent		7.53	93.94	95.88	0.00	50.08	43.86	96.19	0.18	57.99	35.96	94.95	7.78	91.23	**2.71**
		HiddenKiller		19.26	78.99	95.46	0.00	50.10	28.89	96.66	5.96	66.89	**12.10**	94.63	4.02	58.59	20.39
	HSOL	BadNets	95.69	5.79	95.32	92.35	7.56	88.22	7.09	93.21	14.18	91.63	**3.69**	89.95	15.36	89.94	5.38
		AddSent		5.36	95.53	91.52	7.59	57.07	38.46	91.76	10.14	78.66	16.87	90.01	15.31	90.42	**5.11**
		HiddenKiller		48.99	74.40	91.19	0.08	50.03	24.36	91.75	10.89	60.17	14.22	89.71	52.18	72.35	**2.05**
	AG	BadNets	91.17	10.53	89.70	90.60	16.98	65.26	24.43	91.43	9.82	89.93	**0.50**	88.70	14.49	86.17	3.53
		AddSent		10.09	90.27	91.13	28.31	54.83	35.43	92.27	16.38	65.20	25.07	89.40	12.80	86.93	**3.33**
		HiddenKiller		23.07	78.93	90.70	48.09	38.93	40.00	91.33	20.00	71.17	7.77	89.37	23.78	77.40	**1.53**

Results 2


GA
NPO
RGA
BadNet
AddSent
HiddenKiller
Bert (SST)
Llama (SST)
Bert (HSOL)
Llama (HSOL)
Bert (AG)
Llama (AG)

Conclusions

- We identify a previously overlooked failure mode, **trigger shifting.** Vanilla GA does not necessarily remove the backdoor but can **redirect** it into a new trigger-induced behavior.
- We provide a theoretical analysis explaining why trigger shifting occurs.
- We propose **Robust Gradient Ascent (RGA),** which introduces a dynamic penalty that decays GA strength to prevent trigger shifting while preserving model utility.
- Across multiple attacks, datasets, and model families, RGA consistently achieves strong backdoor removal while maintaining high clean performance.