Eliciting Harmful Capabilities by Fine-Tuning on Safeguarded Outputs

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MATS

Threat Model

	Willingness	**Capability**
Open-source Models	High	Weak

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Distilled Open-source Model	High	Strong

The Attack - Harmful Capabilities without Jailbreaking



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

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Rubrics — count the number correct keywords in the response

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75% label agreement with human experts

Anchored comparison — use LLM judge to compare response to “anchor” responses of known quality

88% label agreement with human experts

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Consistent uplift across all 4 models and both metrics only with the elicitation attacks.

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

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

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

How does the attack scale?

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Attack improves as frontier models improve. No adversary innovation needed. Chemical weapons performance increases over time.



How much data do you need?

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Only requires ~1k samples for significant uplift on chemical weapons tasks.



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Science/Engineering	17.7 ± 3.5	Inorganic Chem. Synthesis	7.4 ± 3.4
Biology	16.9 ± 4.1	Organic Chemistry (No Synthesis)	28.6 ± 4.9
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How much worse than fine-tuning on harmful data?

Fine-tuning on cheese making, fermentation, candle chemistry is ~2/3 as effective as fine-tuning on chemical weapons data directly.



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Defences? —KYC? Unlearning / implanting false facts in open-source models?

Thanks!

Read the paper:

Email: jackkaunis@protonmail.com

Feel free to reach out with any questions!