Safety Mirage: How Spurious Correlations Undermine VLM Safety Fine-Tuning and Can Be Mitigated by Machine Unlearning

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ICLR

Paper Code

VLM Safety Fine-tuning Setup

- VLM safety fine-tuning aims to **reject unsafe inputs**, while **preserving** utility on **benign** tasks.

$$\boldsymbol{\theta}_{\mathrm{u}} = \mathrm{argmin}_{\boldsymbol{\theta}} \underbrace{\ell_{\mathrm{u}}(\boldsymbol{\theta}; \mathcal{D}_{\mathrm{u}})}_{\text{Unsafe}} + \gamma \underbrace{\ell_{\mathrm{r}}(\boldsymbol{\theta}; \mathcal{D}_{\mathrm{r}})}_{\text{Retain}}$$

$\mathcal{D}_{\mathrm{u}}$: unsafe set to be aligned,
$\mathcal{D}_{\mathrm{r}}$: retain set to preserve utility

- Commonly achieved via **supervised fine-tuning** (SFT)[1] on curated datasets (e.g., **VLGuard**[2], **SPA-VL**[3])
- **Over-prudence**: SFT aligned VLMs may **reject benign** queries[4].

Spurious Correlation

- Spurious correlations arise when **superficial input features** (e.g., prompt words) are associated with **safety labels**.



(a) VLGuard safe (b) VLGuard unsafe

Figure 1. Frequency of question-initiating words used in training queries.

- ✓ Non-rejection bias: Prompt words (“what ”) linked to **non-rejection responses** enabling **jailbreak.**
- ✓ Rejection-bias: Prompt words (“share”, “can”) linked to **rejection responses** causing **over-prudence.**

Overview Framework of Safety Mirage



Figure 2. Safety mirage in VLMs: safety SFT introduces spurious shortcuts. A single-word change can jailbreak or trigger over-prudence. Unlearning removes these shortcuts and improves robustness.

One-word Attack & Modification

- One-word attack/modification: **replace** the **prompt word** in a query (e.g., “What” for attack, “Share” for modification).



Figure 3. Attack success rate (ASR) and rejection rate (RR) under K-shot one-word attacks/modifications.

✓ **Spurious correlation** creates **word-level shortcuts**, enabling one-word attack.

Enhancing VLM Safety Through Unlearning

- RMU[5] $\ell_{\mathrm{u}}(\boldsymbol{\theta}; \mathcal{D}_{\mathrm{u}}) = \mathbb{E}_{\mathbf{x} \in \mathcal{D}_{\mathrm{u}}} [\| M_{\boldsymbol{\theta}}(\mathbf{x}) - c \cdot \mathbf{v} \|_2^2]$
- NPO[6] $\ell_{\mathrm{u}}(\boldsymbol{\theta}; \mathcal{D}_{\mathrm{u}}) = \mathbb{E}_{\mathbf{x} \in \mathcal{D}_{\mathrm{u}}} \left[-\frac{2}{\beta} \log \sigma \left(-\beta \log \left(\frac{\pi_{\boldsymbol{\theta}}(\mathbf{x})}{\pi_{\mathrm{ref}}(\mathbf{x})} \right) \right) \right]$
- Retain loss $\ell_{\mathrm{r}}(\boldsymbol{\theta}; \mathcal{D}_{\mathrm{r}}) = \ell_{\mathrm{ft}}(\boldsymbol{\theta}; \mathcal{D}_{\mathrm{r}}) + \alpha \ell_{\mathrm{mu,r}}(\boldsymbol{\theta}; \mathcal{D}_{\mathrm{r}})$

Models	Safety Evaluation (ASR, ↓) VLGuard Before	VLGuard After	SPA-VL Before	SPA-VL After	Over-Prudence Evaluation (RR, ↓) VLGuard Before	VLGuard After	SPA-VL Before	SPA-VL After	Utility Evaluation (Acc., ↑) VQAv2	TextVQA	ScienceQA	VizWiz
LLaVA-1.5-7B	64.25%	90.27%	46.42%	52.08%	0.36%	0.36%	14.72%	9.81%	78.53%	58.23%	69.51%	50.07%
+ Unsafe-Filter	65.66%	90.72%	45.66%	54.72%	0.36%	0.36%	15.85%	11.32%	79.14%	58.22%	68.12%	52.14%
+ Mixed-SFT	0.23%	54.98%	14.34%	37.73%	4.48%	91.76%	68.68%	98.87%	78.23%	57.80%	68.27%	52.94%
+ Posthoc-SFT	0.23%	46.83%	13.58%	32.96%	2.69%	90.83%	60.38%	100.0%	78.03%	57.73%	68.42%	51.84%
+ NPO-Unlearning	2.49%	12.92%	18.49%	24.15%	2.51%	11.69%	16.60%	17.36%	77.34%	57.80%	68.02%	50.21%
+ RMU-Unlearning	1.29%	10.18%	17.73%	22.64%	1.25%	7.56%	18.11%	19.24%	77.04%	56.89%	67.68%	50.01%
LLaVA-1.5-7B-LoRA	64.72%	95.25%	44.91%	50.44%	0.18%	0.18%	15.47%	12.45%	79.13%	58.22%	68.62%	52.82%
+ Unsafe-Filter	67.19%	93.89%	45.28%	52.33%	0.36%	0.0%	22.64%	13.21%	79.14%	57.66%	67.97%	53.65%
+ Mixed-SFT	0.45%	69.23%	21.51%	40.13%	3.05%	89.93%	59.25%	97.36%	78.63%	57.24%	68.47%	51.84%
+ Posthoc-SFT	0.23%	51.81%	20.38%	37.61%	3.41%	95.14%	62.26%	99.62%	78.23%	57.17%	67.92%	52.08%
+ NPO-Unlearning	4.56%	18.29%	21.51%	25.28%	2.69%	11.01%	16.98%	19.62%	77.32%	56.98%	66.98%	51.01%
+ RMU-Unlearning	3.87%	11.14%	20.38%	24.24%	1.25%	4.84%	18.49%	21.89%	76.99%	56.62%	66.32%	49.87%

Table 1. Experiment results evaluating safety, over-prudence, and utility of safety fine-tuned VLMs.

✓ Compared to **SFT**, unlearning **shifts** safety from **shortcut-based rejection** to **direct removal** of unsafe content.



Figure 4. Visualization of question-answer pairs from original, safety SFT, and unlearning VLMs.

✓ Unlearning **mitigates spurious shortcuts**, leading to **more robust** safety.

[1] Yi Ding, et al. "Rethinking bottlenecks in safety fine-tuning of vision language models." ICLR 2026.
[2] Yongshuo Zong, et al. "Safety fine-tuning at (almost) no cost: a baseline for vision large language models." ICML 2024.
[3] Yongting Zhang, et al. "Spa-vl: A comprehensive safety preference alignment dataset for vision language models." CVPR 2025.
[4] Yangyang Guo, et al. "The VLLM Safety Paradox: Dual Ease in Jailbreak Attack and Defense." NeurIPS 2025.
[5] Li, Nathaniel, et al. "The wmdp benchmark: Measuring and reducing malicious use with unlearning." ICML 2024.
[6] Zhang, Ruiqi, et al. "Negative preference optimization: From catastrophic collapse to effective unlearning." COLM 2024

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