Visual Exclusivity Attacks: Automatic Multimodal Red Teaming via Agentic Planning

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Takeaway

Multimodal safety is weaker than it looks when the harmful information is embedded in genuine visual understanding rather than obvious hidden payloads.
The proposed method **MM-Plan** achieves 46.3% attack rate on Calude 4.5 Sonnet and 13.8% on GPT5.

Introduction

Prior attacks (top) embed harmful instructions typographically within images. In contrast, Visual Exclusivity (bottom) presents an *Image-as-Basis* threat where text input alone is insufficient—the harmful goal requires reasoning about spatial and functional relationships exclusive to the image.



Methods



MM-Plan framework. Given a harmful goal and image, our Attacker Planner generates complete multi-turn strategies in a single pass. Plans are sampled and executed against victim MLLMs, with rewards collected from a judge model. The policy is updated via GRPO based on relative plan performance.

Results

Method	Open-Weight			Proprietary				
	Llama-3.2	InternVL3	Qwen3-VL	GPT-4o	GPT-5	Sonnet 3.7	Sonnet 4.5	Gemini 2.5
Direct Request	13.4	27.2	11.9	5.0	0.6	4.7	8.4	9.7
FigStep	23.8	44.4	33.1	6.6	0.6	13.4	24.4	11.3
SI-Attack	25.6	31.9	29.1	8.1	1.9	12.8	15.6	12.5
SSA	25.3	39.1	29.4	6.3	1.6	9.7	15.9	12.2
Crescendo	21.9	45.0	33.8	14.4	3.1	15.0	18.1	15.9
MM-Plan	**64.4***	**65.0***	**54.4***	**36.9***	**13.8***	**27.2***	**46.3***	**43.8***

Ablation Study

Table 4. **Cross-Model Transferability.** ASR when transferring agents trained on source models (rows) to target models (columns).

Attacker Source	Target Model	
	Qwen3-VL-8B	Claude 4.5 Sonnet
Direct Plan	22.5	9.7
MM-Plan (from Qwen3-VL-8B)	54.4	29.7
MM-Plan (from Claude 4.5 Sonnet)	50.6	46.3

Table 5. **Generalization to Unseen Queries.** ASR comparison between seen training prompts and novel queries (unseen).

Target Model	All (N=320)	Seen (N=106)	Unseen (N=214)
Qwen3-VL-8B	54.4	56.6	53.3
Claude 4.5 Sonnet	46.3	48.1	45.3

Table 6. **Automated Judge vs. Human Consensus.** Our primary judge demonstrates high alignment with human consensus (9 annotators) across a stratified dataset of 400 trajectories.

Evaluation Dimension	Precision	Recall	Agreement (%)
Safety Violation	93.8	89.5	92.3
Actionable Harm	89.8	87.4	88.5

Table 7. **Ablation on Reward Formulation.** We analyze the contribution of success signal granularity and additional reward components (goal penalty and progress) to ASR.

Method	Reward Components			ASR	
	Success Signal	Goal Penalty	Progress	Qwen3-VL-8B	Claude 4.5 Sonnet
Direct Plan	–	–	–	22.5	9.7
Exp-1	Binary (0/1)	–	–	30.6	10.3
Exp-2	Graded (1-5)	–	–	38.8	25.3
Exp-3	Graded (1-5)	✓	–	42.5	30.6
Exp-4	Graded (1-5)	–	✓	47.5	35.6
MM-Plan	**Graded (1-5)**	✓	✓	**54.4**	**46.3**

Table 8. **Impact of Attacker Backbone.** Comparison of fine-tuned open-weight agents versus proprietary models. While scaling the open-weight backbone improves performance, proprietary models accessed via API fail due to safety refusals.

Access	Attacker Model	Method	ASR on Target	
			Qwen3-VL-8B	Claude 4.5 Sonnet
Open-Weight	Qwen3-VL-4B	Direct Plan	22.5	9.7
		MM-Plan	**54.4**	**46.3**
	Qwen3-VL-8B	Direct Plan	25.3	12.8
		MM-Plan	**61.3**	**47.5**
Proprietary	GPT-5	Direct Plan	0.0	0.0
	Claude 4.5 Sonnet	Direct Plan	0.3	0.0

Paper & Code

Conclusion

Current safety alignment protects models from what text says, not from what images mean. Visual Exclusivity shows that when harm lives in the reasoning, not the words, even frontier models fail.