Generative Adversarial Imitation Learning (GAIL) is a powerful and practical approach for learning sequential decision-making policies. Different from Reinforcement Learning (RL), GAIL takes advantage of demonstration data by experts (e.g., human), and learns both the policy and reward function of the unknown environment. Despite the significant empirical progresses, the theory behind GAIL is still largely unknown. The major difficulty comes from the underlying temporal dependency of the demonstration data and the minimax computational formulation of GAIL without convex-concave structure. To bridge such a gap between theory and practice, this paper investigates the theoretical properties of GAIL. Specifically, we show: (1) For GAIL with general reward parameterization, the generalization can be guaranteed as long as the class of the reward functions is properly controlled; (2) For GAIL, where the reward is parameterized as a reproducing kernel function, GAIL can be efficiently solved by stochastic first order optimization algorithms, which attain sublinear convergence to a stationary solution. To the best of our knowledge, these are the first results on statistical and computational guarantees of imitation learning with reward/policy function ap- proximation. Numerical experiments are provided to support our analysis.