Multiplayer Nash Preference Optimization

Reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) has emerged as the standard paradigm for aligning large language models with human preferences. However, reward-based methods grounded in the Bradley–Terry assumption struggle to capture the nontransitivity and heterogeneity of real-world preferences. To address this, recent studies have reframed alignment as a two-player Nash game, giving rise to Nash learning from human feedback (NLHF). While this perspective has inspired algorithms such as INPO, ONPO, and EGPO that offer strong theoretical and empirical guarantees, they remain fundamentally restricted to two-player interactions, introducing a single-opponent bias that fails to capture the full complexity of realistic preference structures. This work introduces Multiplayer Nash Preference Optimization (MNPO), a novel framework that generalizes NLHF to the multiplayer regime. It formulates alignment as an $n$-player game, where each policy competes against a population of opponents while being regularized toward a reference model. We demonstrate that MNPO inherits the equilibrium guarantees of two-player methods while enabling richer competitive dynamics and improved coverage of diverse preference structures. Comprehensive empirical evaluation shows that MNPO consistently outperforms existing NLHF baselines on instruction-following benchmarks, achieving superior alignment quality under heterogeneous annotator conditions and mixed-policy evaluation scenarios. Together, these results establish MNPO as a principled and scalable framework for aligning LLMs with complex, non-transitive human preferences. Code is available at~\url{https://github.com/smiles724/MNPO}.